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ABSTRACT 
Extensive research on bankruptcy still has not made it possible to end the efficiency discussion 
concerning the need for a reorganization provision in bankruptcy laws. In this paper, I discuss 
the pervasiveness of asset sales in bankruptcy procedures and the effect it has on survival 
rates. Without these figures on going concern asset sales Western countries show 
astonishingly low firm survival rates. In addition, it becomes clear that the bankruptcy system 
in the US may be under-researched to such an extent that it seriously confounds our view of 
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Bankruptcy has been a fruitful area of research. Especially, Chapter 11, the 
reorganization procedure in the American Bankruptcy Code, has been subject of 
many theoretical and empirical studies. Despite this research, academics and 
practitioners are yet not fully resolved around the issue whether or not Chapter 11 can 
be seen as an efficient institution. Although Chapter 11 offers firms a way out of 
financial troubles, doubts remain whether it does not lead to the continuation of firms 
that should have been liquidated, redistributes value in such a way that it provides 
incentive for opportunistic behavior, and in the duration of procedures provides –
presumably- ample opportunity for legal service firms to earn a living.1 A similar 
discussion has also been going on in Europe. Based on sparse evidence regarding 
their respective liquidation procedures, a number of European governments (France, 
Finland, Germany and Belgium in chronological order) have concluded that it leads to 
liquidation in too many cases. One of the consequences could be that such a 
procedure would stifle entrepreneurial risk taking. Given the idea that especially the 
new, small firms innovate and that the US is top-performer in this respect, it is no 
wonder that Chapter 11 has been a major inspiration to various European lawmakers 
in seeking to redress the failings of their respective systems. It is the mix of the 
unresolved efficiency discussion, the lack of empirical findings and the drive towards 
new bankruptcy rules in Europe that motivates this paper. The purpose of this paper is 
to find out how different systems perform with respect to the survival of the debtor-
firm, either by way of a going concern asset sale or a restructuring of liabilities. The 
major findings are that, firstly, much stylized facts about bankruptcy resolution give 
rise towards more questions than answers, and secondly, that the focus on Chapter 11 
as the model for the restructuring of liabilities leads one to overlook the importance of 
the other major mode of restructuring in bankruptcy, i.e. the going concern asset sale. 
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 See, among others, Gilson (1997), Hotchkiss (1995), Franks & Torous (1994). 
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2 Bankruptcy: an asset or a liability management 
problem? 
In principle, at least from an economic point of view, it should not matter whether a 
firm in bankruptcy sells all the assets, or rewrites its financial contracts. Selling off 
the assets to the highest bidder provides the estate’s trustee with the cash to 
compensate the claimholders of the bankrupt firm. The bidder may choose any way in 
which to organize the assets and its corresponding capital structure. With a rewriting 
of the financial contracts one merely skips the cash-part associated with the asset sale. 
Financiers are asked to accept new financial contracts, specifying payments that are in 
line with the value of the firm. From this perspective, going concern asset sales and 
financial re-contracting are equal alternatives in resolving financial distress. It follows 
that one should look at both mechanisms of financial distress resolution. It is obvious 
that imperfections in asset markets and re-contracting failures may lead to differences 
in the (direct and indirect costs) associated with each of these modes of restructuring.2 
However, for the moment, I merely want to make the point that both modes are equal 
alternatives in resolving distress. 
If one takes a look at some bankruptcy procedures around the developed world, then 
liquidation-based rules, i.e. systems in which the rules facilitate, or even “force”, the 
sale of assets, seemed to be the norm not so long ago. Especially, European 
insolvency law seemed geared towards liquidation. France, Germany, Belgium and 
Finland added a reorganization chapter to their insolvency laws only fairly recently. 
As an example of such a system that “forces” the trustee to sell assets in bankruptcy, 
consider the Dutch situation. Legal rules in Dutch Civil Code allow firms to sell the 
assets to another firm. In the process of selling these assets the employee contracts are 
automatically transferred to the buying party. Only in bankruptcy does this rule not 
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 For a discussion of asset market illiquidity see Schleifer and Vishny (1992), and Pulvino 
(1999) and Strömberg (2000) for some empirical evidence concerning asset illiquidity. 
See Gilson (1997), Hotchkiss (1995) for some evidence concerning the re-contracting 
failures. 
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apply.3 The idea behind this rule was a European Directive to protect employees for a 
sudden (opportunistic) asset sale in order to shed employees. As such, the Dutch rule 
finds its equivalent in various forms in the other European countries.4 Apart from 
other rules in the Dutch system that have an impact upon the way to solve distress, it 
seems only logical to hypothesize that this rule leads to many an asset sale in 
bankruptcy.  
Taking into consideration that various bankruptcy procedures were, or still are, geared 
towards liquidation, i.e. selling assets, it is amazing to find so little research that sheds 
light on the issue of asset sales in bankruptcy. Most of the studies on bankruptcy 
concern the US Bankruptcy Code and focus on Chapter 11. Chapter 11 gives debtors 
the possibility to restructure their liabilities, i.e. adjust their capital structure. Chapter 
7 of the Code regulates the orderly liquidation of the assets of the firm. The empirical 
studies on Chapter 11 focus on the restructuring efforts of larger firms. The asset sales 
in these restructurings are not central to the resolution, but are supposed to provide 
the financial means for the liability restructuring and/or to eliminate loss-making 
subsidiaries.5 White (1984) is one of the first to study smaller firms in Chapter 11. 
She finds that 23% of her sample firms resolves distress by selling all assets. 
Thorburn (2000) studies the Swedish liquidation-based bankruptcy system. She finds 
that 75% of her sample involves a going concern sale in which the most important 
parts of a firm’s activities are continued, either by the old manager/owner or by new 
owners. If this percentage is taken as a valid measure for the successful restructuring 
of firms in Sweden,6 then it is in stark contrast to Chapter 7 in the US, which, as most 
scholars assume, ends in piecemeal liquidation of firms. Lawless et al. (1994) point 
out that relatively much is known about Chapter 11 procedures, but nearly nothing is 
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 Dutch Civil Code Book 7:662-666. 
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 See Kaiser (1996) and Franks, Nyborg & Torous (1996) for a similar comment 
concerning the French situation. 
5
 See Gilson, John & Lang (1990), Franks & Torous (1994),  Brown, James & Mooradian 
(1994). 
6
 It should be noted that Thorburn studied firms with a minimum of 20 employees. This 
size criterion probably leads to an upward bias in her study in the number of firms 
“surviving” bankruptcy with respect to the surviving fraction of firms in the population of 
bankrupt firms in Sweden.  
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known about small firms in either Chapter 11 or 7. A recent large-scale study by 
Warren & Westbrook (2000) focuses on (small) business bankruptcies, either in 
Chapter 7, 11, or 13. They find surprisingly different patterns in resolving financial 
distress. Especially, smaller firms seem to be using Chapter 11 much more often that 
hitherto has been assumed. However, the research project does not yet reveal what 
happens to the assets of firms in Chapter 7, i.e. going concern sales, or piecemeal 
liquidations. 
Notwithstanding this lack in our understanding in the resolution of financial distress 
in smaller firms in the US or the UK, even much less is known about other countries. 
In Germany, not much more is known than the publications by the national bureau of 
statistics. These data do not make it possible to find out what happens to the assets of 
the bankrupt firm. Besides, the new bankruptcy code has been in effect from only 
January 1, 1999. No data are yet available on this new situation. With respect to 
France, some more is known, especially through the work of Kaiser (1996), but this is 
still insufficient to judge the efficiency of this system. Although many data are simply 
not available, or have never been collected before, it is possible to provide some 
evidence on the issue of the pervasiveness of asset sales in bankruptcy. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to point out that the discussion below can only be 
indicative in nature. This is due to the fact that many studies are based on samples 
with different characteristics and in many instances cannot be considered as statistical 
good representations of bankruptcy populations. Nevertheless, putting these figures 
together, with due regard for the difficulties in comparing them, still provides a tale 
worth telling.  
3 Reorganization in different systems 
The purpose of this paper is to find out how different systems perform with respect to 
the survival of the debtor-firm, either by way of a going concern asset sale or a 
restructuring of liabilities. To complicate things, different bankruptcy systems offer 
firms different routes that ultimately lead to the survival of firms. To make things 
5 
clear, figure 1 gives a more or less generalized overview of survival routes through a 
bankruptcy system that incorporates a reorganization and a liquidation procedure.  
When a firm enters a bankruptcy procedure it can either opt for reorganization or 
liquidation. In the reorganization procedure firms are given the opportunity to 
renegotiate with creditors in order to adjust their liabilities. This process may take 
some time in which the firm is sheltered from “aggressive” creditors that demand 
repayment, or want to collect collateral. If such a process yields an acceptable 
agreement, i.e. plan or composition, then a court has the power to confirm that plan. 
Confirmed plans can be forced upon dissenting creditors.7 Those firms that fail in 
their attempts to get a plan accepted are in most instances transferred to the 
liquidation procedure. Empirical research, to be discussed below, shows that either 
the confirmed plans can be liquidation plans in disguise, going concern asset sales, or 
“real” reorganization plans. These real reorganization plans can either be successful 
or not. Those firms that cannot comply with the terms of the plan normally re-enter 
the bankruptcy procedure. Only those firms that either successfully fulfill their 
obligations associated with the plan, or those that sell their assets going concern to a 
third party, can be categorized as “survived firms”. Note, however, that survived 
firms can get into trouble for a second time, in which the whole procedure starts 
again. Those firms that have a liquidation plan in disguise are categorized as 
“eliminated firms”, i.e. these are the firms that sell their assets piecemeal. 
Consequently, the synergies that existed by combining these specific assets are lost. 
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 Bankruptcy procedures specify several minimum requirements a plan must attain in order 
to get confirmation, e.g., with respect to voting requirements, pay out forms and priority 
rules.  
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In the liquidation procedure firms can either sell their assets piecemeal, or, via a 
going concern asset sale, sell assets as a complex in which the asset specific synergies 
may be retained. Although the corporate form of these latter firms may ultimately 
cease to exist, the economic activities of these firms survive, probably in another 
corporate shell.8 
In the next section, I give a brief overview of the “setup” of some bankruptcy systems 
in order to make clear how these various procedures are to be reconciled with 
figure 1. The choice of these systems is constrained to those for which data is 
available to “fill” in figure 1. This actual “system-performance” is to be discussed in 
subsequent sections of the paper. 
3.1 An overview of survival routes in different systems 
Obviously, many systems are more or less look-a-likes, but some systems differ 
remarkably in their basic setup. For instance, the basic set up of bankruptcy systems 
of the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Finland (before the change in 1993) looks 
very much alike,9 but the English system and the American system differ remarkably 
from each other as well as from the other systems. In this section, I briefly discuss the 
set up of these look-a-likes (using Sweden as the prime example), France, Germany, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3.1.1 Sweden 
Thorburn (2000, p. 338) characterizes the Swedish bankruptcy system as an 
auctioning system, with no effective reorganization provision. Nevertheless, a 
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 Note that even bankruptcy systems that can be seen as liquidation-based systems (e.g., the 
Dutch Code, Swedish Code, the old German Code), still offer firms both procedures. 
However, they differ substantially from reorganization-based systems in the requirements 
the firms have to meet in order to successfully conclude the reorganization procedure. 
9
  It should be noted that although the basic set up is similar, the details may differ 
substantially.  
8 
composition procedure is provided for in the law, but is seldom used by firms to 
resolve financial distress.10 In the composition procedure the firm may offer its 
ordinary creditors a composition. The composition rules do not apply to secured 
creditors and those holding priority claims. The procedure does not provide for an 
automatic stay of creditors. Any write down on the secured and priority claims by 
these creditors is voluntarily. In Finland and Sweden a firm can only offer a 
composition if ordinary creditors are offered at least 25% of their nominal claim (see 
Sundgren, 1995, p. 177). This means that the reorganization route in figure 1 is 
effectively non-existent in these two countries. If the composition procedure is not 
used, then the only alternative is the bankruptcy liquidation procedure. Firms, as well 
as creditors may petition for bankruptcy. With the start of the proceedings an 
independent trustee, appointed by the court, replaces the incumbent management 
team. This trustee has a fiduciary responsibility to creditors. The liquidation 
procedure in Sweden offers the trustee the possibility to continue operations under an 
automatic stay provision and to attract debtor-in-possession financing with super-
priority (according to Thorburn, this DIP-financing is in most instances provided for 
by trade creditors). The trustee organizes a sale of all the assets, either piecemeal or as 
a going concern. The proceeds of this sale are to be distributed according to absolute 
priority. Administrative costs and DIP-financing have super-priority; secured claims 
are entitled the proceeds of the sale of the collateral, any unpaid part is treated as an 
unsecured claim; next in line are audit claims, tax claims, wage claims, and lastly, 
unsecured claims. It seems clear that if firms are to survive in these systems the only 
route is the one via a going concern sale in bankruptcy. 
3.1.2 France11 
Among the European countries, France was among the first to fundamentally change 
its insolvency law. In 1985 an extensive reorganization procedure was added to its 
                                                          
10
  Thorburn (2000) reports that only a negligible fraction of firms file for composition 
proceedings. Sundgren (1995) discusses similar results for the Finnish case. 
11
  This discussion relies heavily on Joosen (1998), Kaiser (1996) and Moret Ernst & Young 
9 
bankruptcy system. Now France has two procedures that are aimed at reorganizing 
the firm and one procedure aimed at liquidating the firm. The negotiated settlement 
(“Réglement Amaible”) is an informal procedure in which the firm tries to reach a 
voluntary agreement with its creditors concerning the payment on their claims. The 
president of the court may appoint a negotiator to assist in concluding an arrangement 
with creditors. After a change in the rules in 1994 the negotiator may ask for a stay of 
creditors in order to successfully conclude an arrangement. If a company has ceased 
paying his debts, then it cannot petition for a negotiated settlement anymore. Instead 
it has to petition for the second procedure, the “Redressement Judiciaire”, or judicial 
arrangement. Not only the firm itself but also a creditor, the court, public prosecutor 
or workers council may request for a judicial arrangement.12 The court (“tribunal de 
commerce”) decides whether to start the proceedings, or if it is evident from the 
financial situation of the company that a reorganization is impossible, then the court 
may start a liquidation proceeding directly. With the judicial arrangement an 
observation period starts in which a court appointed administrator investigates 
whether the company should be reorganized.13 During this period, management 
remains in charge, although the court may decide to leave certain responsibilities to 
the administrator. Furthermore, creditors face an automatic stay of individual 
collection proceedings during this period, and are obligated to continue their 
deliveries, or are obligated to keep the lines of credit open. The administrator 
ultimately advises the court either to reorganize or to liquidate the company. After 
hearing the various parties the court decides on this issue and in its judgment specifies 
whether the company should be reorganized according to a “plan de continuation”, or 
whether it should be sold to a third party (“plan de cession”). In this sale not only 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1996). 
12
  It should be noted that in France an early warning system is in place, in which the auditor 
has the obligation to report on the imminent financial problems. Since 1994 the auditor is 
obliged to send a copy of his report to the court if management or shareholders are  unable 
to sufficiently guarantee the continuation of the firm.  
13
  The judicial arrangement comes in two forms, one for large companies and a more 
simplified procedure for small companies. In the discussion the focus is on the procedure 
for the large companies. The observation period for large company procedure is 6 months, 
but may be extended twice. 
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assets are to be transferred, but also various contracts (e.g., contracts with trade 
creditors, leasing arrangements) that are deemed essentially for the firm to survive as 
a going concern. If assets are used as security for financing arrangements, then these 
arrangements are also transferred to the buyer. The buyer can acquire the 
collateralized assets free of the obligations, if he fully pays down the debt associated 
with the assets. When this system is put into the context of figure 1, then it seems 
obvious that the negotiated settlement and judicial arrangement are aimed at 
reorganizing the firm. The judicial arrangement should in principle lead to a, 
rephrased in the terminology of figure 1, confirmed reorganization plan. This 
confirmed reorganization plan has two important forms in solving financial distress, 
that is the “plan de continuation”, or the “really reorganization plan”-box in figure 1, 
and the “plan de cession”, or the “really asset sale plan”-box in figure 1. Last but not 
least, in the liquidation procedure (“Liquidation Judiciaire”) the assets of the firm are 
sold and after settling the claims, the company ceases to exist. It seems unlikely that 
in the liquidation procedure firms may continue operations via a going concern asset 
sale, given the fact that the going concern asset sale is explicitly defined and regulated 
in the “plan de cession”. Furthermore, the regulations concerning the transfer of the 
various contracts (especially employment, leasing and financing contracts) in this 
“plan de cession” makes it difficult to execute an asset sale in the liquidation 
procedure. The presumption thus found in the literature is that most firms in the 
liquidation procedure are sold piecemeal. 
3.1.3 Germany14 
The German system has many features in common with the Swedish system. 
However, with the introduction of the new “Insolvenzverfahren” in 1999 a 
completely new procedure, specifically aimed at the reorganization of the firm, 
replaced the existing system. Before 1999, German had a liquidation procedure 
(“Konkursverfahren”) and a composition procedure (“Vergleichsverfahren”). The 
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 The discussion relies on Eger (2001), Franks, Nyborg & Torous (1996), Kaiser (1996), 
and Moret, Ernst & Young (1996). 
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composition procedure was meant to avoid a “Konkurs”. Its aim was to offer the firm 
a way out of financial distress, by giving the firm the possibility to offer its ordinary 
creditors partial payment on their claims. However, the composition rules did not 
apply to secured and preferred creditors. The procedure did not provide for an 
automatic stay of the secured and preferred creditors. Furthermore, management 
remained in control of operations. In order to get a composition accepted ordinary 
creditors had to be guaranteed at least 35% of their claim. If an agreement could not 
be reached, then the court could directly transfer the firm to the liquidation procedure. 
In a “Konkursverfahren” management lost all control to a court appointed trustee. The 
trustee could continue business activities if deemed necessary. However, the focus of 
the procedure was to sell all assets. Unsecured creditors faced an unlimited automatic 
stay. Ultimately, all proceeds were to be paid out to creditors according to absolute 
priority, with the usual ranking (i.e., secured creditors, administrative costs and estate 
creditors, certain employee claims, taxes, unsecured claims). The new 
“Insolvenzverfahren” merges both procedures into one. The aim of the procedure is to 
come to an insolvency plan (“Insolvenzplan”). In this plan the firm may be continued, 
sold off as going concern, or be liquidated piecemeal. This plan is to be made up by 
the trustee within at most three months, in which an automatic stay is in effect for all 
creditors. In the new procedure secured creditors are obligated to shoulder some of 
the estate costs and most preferred creditors (especially employees and the state) have 
lost their former preferential treatment. All creditors are classified into groups 
according to their ranking, or business interests. A plan is agreed upon if each 
individual group accepts it on a simple majority vote (on both the number of creditors 
as well as on the total amount of claims). The court may cram down the plan on a 
dissenting group if the plan leaves the group better off than under the old system (i.e., 
presumably a liquidation). The new procedure effectively groups the reorganization 
and liquidation together and leaves it to the participants to decide upon the best 
course of action.  
12 
3.1.4 United Kingdom15 
The United Kingdom has an elaborate system of rules, which in some aspects differ 
remarkably from the continental systems. Four procedures are aimed at the 
reorganization of a debtor’s business: Scheme of Arrangement, Company Voluntary 
Arrangement (CVA), Administration and Administrative Receivership. Two 
procedures are specifically aimed at the liquidation of the debtor’s business: Creditors 
Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) and the Compulsory Liquidation. The Scheme of 
Arrangement is the least restrictive of the four reorganization procedures. It is simply 
a procedure in which the court sanctions an out-of-court arrangement between debtor 
and creditors.16 The CVA is a court-supervised procedure in which the firm is to be 
reorganized according to a plan proposed to shareholders and creditors. The plan may 
specify a restructuring of liabilities and/or a disposal of assets. The proposal for such 
a plan is made by directors. The plan calls for the nomination of an insolvency 
practitioner to supervise the implementation. This practitioner advises the court 
whether creditors should consider plan. If this is the case then on a meeting of 
creditors the plan may be modified, rejected or approved. In the case that creditors 
accept the plan (on a majority of 75% in value of the creditors present and voting), 
then the practitioner supervises the implementation of the plan. The CVA does not 
provide for an automatic stay, nor can the plan infringe upon the rights of secured 
creditors. Administration is a court-supervised reorganization procedure in which 
many rules of the CVA are mimicked, but with far more powers for the administrator. 
CVA and Administration may even be combined in which the administrator takes on 
the duties of the insolvency practitioner. A company, its directors, or creditors may 
request the court for an administration order, but it will only be granted if the 
company will realize more value under an Administration order than under a 
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Nyborg & Torous (1996), Kaiser (1996), and Moret, Ernst & Young (1996). It should be 
noted that I restrict the discussion to the procedures available to (corporate) debtors in 
England. 
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  Although the plan will only be legally binding if a majority of the creditors in number 
representing 75% of the nominal value of the claims in any creditor class agree to the 
proposed arrangement. 
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liquidation order. Furthermore, secured creditors are given the opportunity to appoint 
a (administrative) receiver before the order is made. If the petition for Administration 
is successful, then the administrator takes over the control of the company. He has to 
prepare a reorganization plan that is to be presented to all creditors within three 
months. During this period all creditors are stayed. If the plan is accepted, the 
administrator implements the plan. If all goes according to plan, then control 
ultimately reverts to the directors of the company. In the case that reorganization of 
the company fails (and thus the company is insolvent), then Administration is 
followed by a liquidation order. Administrative Receivership is a similar procedure to 
the Administration; only now the creditor holding a floating charge appoints the 
administrative receiver (if the creditor holds a fixed charge then it is called a (fixed 
charge) Receivership). This procedure can only be started if the company is in default 
on its loan, or if a request has been made by the company for an Administration order. 
The receiver assumes control of the company with the aim to realize sufficient value 
from the assets to repay the loan. This value may realize via a reorganization of the 
company, or via an asset sale. In the majority of cases the assets are sold either as 
going concern or piecemeal. The assets that are to be sold are transferred 
unencumbered with the existing contractual provisions and employees are most often 
discharged by the receiver before such a sale (see Kaiser, 1996, p. 75). If the assets 
are encumbered by a fixed charge, the proceeds must be paid out to the charge holder. 
In (Administrative) Receiverships there is no stay of creditors, although the receiver 
may terminate contracts with suppliers and other contractors. In the case that 
sufficient funds remain so that ordinary creditors should receive compensation, then a 
separate liquidator must be appointed to distribute these funds. In the case that the 
firm cannot be rescued via reorganization, a liquidation procedure is started. 
Assuming that the firm is insolvent, the procedure can be started by shareholders (a 
Creditors Voluntary Liquidation), or via a petition to the court (a Compulsory 
Liquidation).17  A creditor, administrator, receiver or the court itself may instigate the 
latter upon request. The assets in a liquidation order may be sold going concern, or 
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  If the firm is solvent the procedure to be followed is the Members’ Voluntary Liquidation, 
in which a liquidator is appointed by shareholders.  
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piecemeal. The proceeds of this sale are distributed to creditors and, ultimately, the 
company will cease to exist. When all procedures are put into the context of figure 1, 
the schemes of arrangement, CVA’s and Administrations are aimed at the 
reorganization of the company. The plans that are to be proposed to creditors can be 
interpreted as either confirmed reorganization plans, or as failed reorganization plans. 
These plans may involve either a restructuring of liabilities, or a disposal of assets. 
The receivership procedure is more problematic. It is classified as a court-supervised 
reorganization procedure, although it seems that in many instances it involves a sale 
of the business. In the remainder, I follow this interpretation of receiverships as a 
reorganization procedure. Lastly, the liquidation procedure may obviously end in 
either a going concern asset sale or piecemeal sale of assets. 
3.1.5 United States18 
The United States offer companies two main procedures to resolve financial distress: 
Chapter 7 (liquidation of the firm) and Chapter 11 (reorganization of the firm). A firm 
or creditors may file a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The court appoints a trustee who closes down the business and sells all assets. 
He pays out the proceeds to the creditors according to the standard priority rule in the 
following order: administrative expenses, claims with (statutory) priority, and 
unsecured claims. Secured creditors stay out of this ordering. They have the right to 
claim specific assets, or the revenues of the sale of these assets, of the firm. Firms as 
well as creditors may file a petition for reorganization of the firm under the Chapter 
11 procedure. The procedure suspends the collection efforts of secured and unsecured 
creditors (automatic stay), and the firm may continue to use the creditor’s collateral in 
his business. The procedure gives the debtor the exclusive right for 120 days to file a 
reorganization plan. The court may extend this period. If the debtor does not succeed 
in filing a plan, or creditors do not agree with its terms, then creditors may file their 
own. In the plan all creditors are assigned to a specific class depending on their status 
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(secured, preferred, ordinary, or other). Furthermore, the plan must specify that 
creditors will receive at least an amount that is not less than the amount they would 
have received if the debtor would have been liquidated. The plan must also specify 
the means for its execution. The means may be cash, but may also be debt or equity 
securities, or a combination of these three, to be distributed among the participants. 
All creditor classes, including the equity class if the plan specifies that shareholders 
will receive some compensation, have to vote on the plan.19 A plan is deemed to be 
accepted by a class of creditors if a qualified majority of the creditors in that class 
vote in favor of the plan. If a class votes against the plan, then the court may still 
confirm the plan if it is deemed fair and equitable (“cram down” provision). 
3.2 Reorganization rates in different systems 
In order to find out the fraction of firms that survive bankruptcy, data is needed to fill 
in figure 1. At least data is needed on the number of reorganizations in reorganization 
procedures and on the number of going concern sales in reorganization procedures 
and in liquidation procedures. I start by giving data on the reorganization procedure 
on four countries in table 1. Note that the choice of countries in table 1 is not entirely 
“free”; only for these countries are these data available. In table 1, the variables are 
defined as follows. The “reorganization rate” is defined as the ratio of the number of 
firms in a reorganization procedure to the total number of bankrupt firms, i.e. the 
number of firms in liquidation and reorganization procedures. The “confirmation 
rate” is defined as the ratio of the number of firms that have their reorganization plans 
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  Although it should be noted that only impaired creditors may vote on the plan. A creditor 
is considered unimpaired if the plan, from a legal and equitable perspective, leaves its 
contractual claim intact. 
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Table 1 Reorganization in four countries  
Country US UK G Fr 
Reorganization rate  28%* 14% 0,2%# 20% 
Confirmation rate 41%** 15% 64%## 13% 
Legend: Data concerning the US see Bankruptcy Yearbook Almanac (*), ** see 
White (1984). Concerning UK: See SPI eighth survey (1999). Concerning Germany 
(G): # see Statistisches Bundesamt, ## see Kaiser (1996). Concerning France (Fr): see 
Kaiser. 
 
For the reorganization rate in the US, I retrieved data from the website of the 
Bankruptcy Yearbook Almanac to estimate the average reorganization rate over the 
period 1980 – 1996. The number of Chapter 11 filings per year divided by the sum of 
Chapter 7, 11, and 13 filings, correcting for non-business bankruptcies, yielded an 
average reorganization rate of 28% (with standard deviation of 5,2%).20 The 
confirmation rate as reported in table 1, comes from White (1984). Note that White 
reported that an additional 6% of her sample firms were awaiting confirmation of 
their plans. From Flynn (1989), Lopucki & Whitford (1993), Eisenberg & Sundgren 
(1997) and Ravid & Sundgren (1998) it follows that confirmation rates are related to 
firm size. If these studies are taken together then it seems that confirmation rates in 
the US for firms with a median size of $ 0,5 to $ 1 million, are in between the 13% to 
30% range. The median size in the study by White was $ 1,7 million. The higher 
confirmation rate in her study may therefore be attributable to a size bias. Based upon 
these considerations, I take this figure as a higher bound for the confirmation rate in 
the US for smaller firms. It should be noted that these figures only incorporate the 
promised payments. Jensen-Conklin (1992) in her study of smaller firms in Chapter 
11, finds that 42% of the firms cannot comply with their plans. Therefore, the 
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 Chapter 7 and 13 procedures contain mostly personal bankruptcies, but also some 
business bankruptcies, as is revealed by data of the American Bankruptcy Institute. No 
data were available to me on personal bankruptcies in Chapter 11.  
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confirmation rate of the plans that are successful could be lower than the confirmation 
rate reported in the table above.  
For the United Kingdom, the situation differs in some respects from the United States 
as well as from several European countries. I used the data as published in the eighth 
survey of the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (SPI) as base material for 
estimating the ratios defined above, covering the period July 1997 to June 1998.21 
According to the Society, this latest survey is a better approximation of the 
characteristics of the population of formal insolvencies than earlier surveys. 
Especially the number of sampled CVA’s (company voluntary arrangement) differs 
from the earlier surveys. The reorganization rate is calculated by adding up the 
administrations, CVA’s and receiverships and dividing by the total number of 
insolvency proceedings.22 One could argue that only administrations and CVA’s are 
really aimed at the reorganization of the company, but here I follow the official 
interpretation in estimating the reorganization rate.23 The confirmation rate can only 
indirectly be derived from the SPI-data. Based on SPI-sample data I calculated the 
confirmation rate at 15%.24  
A remarkable finding is the reorganization rate in Germany (0,2%).25 Note that this 
figure concerns the period before the new reorganization procedure took effect in 
Germany. This percentage is absurdly low; it implies that reorganization procedures 
are nearly never started in Germany. This same finding can also be observed in other 
European countries. For instance, in Sweden only very few firms attempt to use the 
reorganization procedure. According to Thorburn (2000) the percentage is about 1%. 
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 See their website: http://www.r3.org.uk 
22
 This ratio is based on the population of insolvency proceedings in the UK. 
23
 If one leaves receiverships out, then the ratio is 5%, instead of 14%. 
24
 I calculated the number of company preservations for CVA’s (63% of 30 cases) and 
added the number of administration preservations (41% of 22 cases) and divided that by 
the number of reorganizations (administrations, CVA’s and receiverships) in the sample. 
This yields the confirmation rate of 15%. Note that the number of administration 
preservations might also include going concern sales, but this can not be derived from the 
data in the eighth survey.  
25
 Calculated as the average fraction of court compositions to total insolvencies over the 
years 1992-1998. 
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Finally, as a last example, the reorganization rate in the Netherlands is very low, 
about 2,8%.26 However, these figures cannot really be compared with the other (three) 
countries in table 1. In neither of these systems exists a well-developed reorganization 
procedure. Consequently, the number of “officially” reorganized firms is very low, 
depressing the ratio. 
The further remarkable finding is the high confirmation rate in Germany (64%).27 It 
might be explained by the argument that the few firms that ultimately get into the 
reorganization procedure have probably a good chance of reorganizing successfully.  
The reorganization rate in France (20%) is based on the number of “Redressement 
Judiciaires” as published in Kaiser (1996, table 5, p. 80).28 I took the optimistic view 
that firms that were not immediately liquidated in principle had the chance of 
reorganizing under the procedure. Calculating the reorganization rate then amounts to 
adding up the “eventual liquidations”, “terminations via a sale of assets” and 
“terminations via a reorganization” in Kaiser’s table 5. Dividing this number by total 
proceedings then gives the reorganization rate. The confirmation rate (13%) is 
calculated as the fraction of the “terminations via a reorganization” to this sum. 
The figures of table 1 can be used to estimate the percentage of firms that successfully 
reorganize and continue the activities. Multiplying the reorganization rate with the 
confirmation rate gives the success rate, i.e. the ratio of the number of firms that 
reorganize successfully to the total number of bankrupt firms. For the US this would 
mean a success rate of, approximately, 12% of total bankruptcy cases commenced. 
One should note, however, that I used the figures from White (1984), which might 
have a size bias. Correcting for size, the success rate would be lower. Flynn (1989) 
found for a sample of smaller firms a normalized confirmation rate of 25%. Of these 
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 See Couwenberg (1997) for this percentage. For those familiar with the Dutch system, 
this figure includes the reorganization plans reached in the bankruptcy procedure as well 
as those reached under the postponement of payments procedure (“surseance van 
betaling”). 
27
 Calculated as the average fraction of completed compositions to opened compositions 
(“Vergleichsverfahren”). See the tables 6 and 7 in Kaiser (1996). These tables cover three 
datapoints (1960, 1970, 1980) and the period 1985-1991. 
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confirmed plans, 20% to 30% were going concern sales in disguise instead of a 
restructuring of liabilities, implying a “real” confirmation rate of 20%.29 If I take this 
latter estimate as a sort of lower bound, then it would imply a success rate of 6%. For 
the UK the success rate would be 2%, for Germany 0,13%, for France 3%. All in all 
this means that from the total number of firms that commence bankruptcy 
proceedings, i.e. either a liquidation or a reorganization procedure, only 2% 
(discarding the German figure) to 6% (or 12% based on White) see their 
reorganization attempts on the basis of a judicial reorganization procedure proceed 
successfully. These are indeed astonishingly low figures. 
Overall, reorganization rates, confirmation rates, or success rates can hardly be called 
impressive in the four countries. The overwhelming majority of the insolvency 
proceedings concerns liquidations. This picture is especially bleak if one considers 
that bankruptcy is a small firm problem. Although the data do not reveal very much 
about the size of firms in bankruptcy proceedings and the way in which these 
proceedings end, the available empirical evidence shows that small firms 
predominantly end in liquidation proceedings.30 Presumably, the larger the firm the 
bigger the chance that reorganization proceedings are started and eventually succeed. 
However, on the positive side, it should be noted that the SPI surveys (UK) make 
clear that CVA’s seem especially effective for small firms. Nevertheless, the number 
of firms using this procedure is very low, especially when compared to total 
proceedings. 
Although a direct comparison of these rates is difficult given the diverse bankruptcy 
systems, the data do point in the same direction. A minority of firms applies for the 
reorganization procedures, and a small minority succeeds in reorganizing the 
liabilities.  
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  This table covers the period 1986-1993. 
29
 Jensen-Conklin (1992) finds a similar percentage for her sample. 
30
 See the studies cited above. 
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4 Reorganizing assets or liabilities 
Table 1 gives some evidence of the success of a procedure in reorganizing firms. 
Nevertheless, as figure 1 makes clear it is far from complete. Table 2 gives an 
overview of the way in which firms continue or end their productive activities in 
reorganization procedures. The abbreviation “GCS” in the table stands for “going 
concern sale”, which means that (all or part of) the assets are sold to a third party who 
continues the activities of the bankrupt (selling) firm. The “going concern rate” is 
defined as the ratio of the number of firms - which sold the assets in a going concern 
sale - to the number of firms in the reorganization procedure. The “liquidation rate in 
reorganizations” is defined as the ratio of the number of firms that are liquidated to 
the total number of firms in the reorganization procedure. The term “liquidated” 
implies that the assets are not sold in a going concern asset sale.  
 
Table 2 The way in which reorganization procedures end 
Country US* UK+ G# Fr^ 
Reorganization rate 28% 14% 0,2% 20% 
Confirmation rate of reorganization plans 41% 15% 64% 13% 
GCS in reorganization 23% 39% - 15% 
Liquidations in reorganization 30% 46% - 72% 
Legend: basis for this table are the same studies as reported in table 1. Remarks: * see 
White (1984), except “reorganization rate” (see Bankruptcy Yearbook Almanac); + 
see SPI eighth survey; # see Statistisches Bundesamt; ^ see Kaiser. The lower three 
rows in the column “US” do not count to 100%. The remaining 6% are the firms 
waiting on confirmation of their plans.  
 
Table 2 and figure 1 are related to each other in the following way. The confirmation 
rate of reorganization plans is associated with the box “really reorganization plans” in 
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figure 1, the GCS in reorganization with the box “really asset sale plans” and 
liquidations in reorganizations with the box “really liquidation plans”. Table 2 shows 
that for the US 28% of the bankrupt firms enter Chapter 11. Of these firms 41% see 
their reorganization plans confirmed (an additional 6% still wait for confirmation), 
23% sell the assets in a going concern asset sale, 30% liquidate the assets.31 These 
percentages add up to 100%. Although it is in Chapter 11 that firms are offered the 
possibility to restructure their liabilities, the table shows that the asset sale has an 
important place in Chapter 11. For the UK, the eighth SPI survey provides the data to 
calculate the going concern asset sales; assets are sold in a going concern sale in 39% 
of the cases.32 In France this occurs in only 15% of the cases (based upon the 
“terminations via a sale of assets”). The French liquidation rate is fairly high (72%) 
when compared to either the UK (46%), or US (30%). 
5 Firm survival in bankruptcy systems 
In order to find out whether the success rate can be corrected upward via a 
reorganizing asset sale, one must add the going concern sales in reorganization and 
liquidation procedures. Table 3 documents these data. Before discussing this table, I 
introduce two additional terms. Firstly, the term “GCS in liquidation” is defined as 
the ratio of the number of firms that sell their assets via a going concern sale on the 
total number of firms in a liquidation procedure. Secondly, the term “firm survival 
rate” is defined as the ratio of the number of firms that in liquidation or reorganization 
continues the activities, either by restructuring liabilities or by selling assets in a 
going concern sale, to the total number of firms in a bankruptcy procedure. In table 3, 
I omitted the German figures. Given the fact that so many German firms end up in the 
liquidation procedure, or are simply discarded from the procedure because of lack of 
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 Note that these figures are only valid for as much the figures as found by White (1984) 
are a good approximation of the ways in which bankruptcies end. Further note that 
Jensen-Conklin (1992) found that in her sample 20% of the confirmed plans really were 
liquidation plans.  
32
 Calculation based on the business preservation rate of 54% in a sample of 189 cases 
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assets,33 it seems paramount to have some data about the way in which these 
procedures end. However, I am unaware of any data concerning the liquidation 
procedure in Germany. For the US, I am unaware of any systematic research 
concerning the going concern sales in Chapter 7. Therefore, the definite firm survival 
rate cannot be calculated for the US.  
Table 3 Reorganizations, going concern sales and firm survival rates 
Panel A Reorganizations and liquidations 
Country US UK Fr Sw Fin 
Reorganization rate 28% 14% 20% - - 
   Confirmation rate  41% 15% 13% - - 
   GCS in reorganization 23% 39% 15% - - 
   Liquidations in reorganization 30% 46% 72% - - 
Liquidation rate 72% 86% 80% 100% 100% 
   GCS in liquidation n.a. 10% n.a. 75% 29% 
Panel B Firm survival rate 
Firm survival rate 18% 20% 6% 75% 29% 
Legend: In this table I added the countries Sweden (Sw), figures based on Thorburn 
(2000) and Finland (Fin), figures based on Ravid & Sundgren (1998). For these 
countries data are available concerning their liquidation procedures. The Finnish data 
concern the situation before a reorganization procedure was added to the bankruptcy 
code in 1993. Note that the survival rate for the UK cannot be directly calculated 
from the percentages in Panel A. In this case, the rate can only be calculated based on 
the actual numbers as provided in the eighth SPI-survey. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
minus the company preservations in CVA’s and administrations. 
33
  See Eger (2001) for this observation. 
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Table 3 recapitulates some of the data in table 2, but adds some extra elements from 
figure 1.34 From this figure it should be clear that the liquidation rate and the 
reorganization rate add up to 100%. The GCS in liquidation is associated with the box 
“going concern asset sale” under the liquidation route in figure 1. The box “piecemeal 
liquidation” is left out; it is the difference between the liquidation rate and the GCS in 
liquidation. The firm survival rate in Panel B is associated with the box “survived 
firms” in figure 1 and thus concerns all firms that survived bankruptcy, either via 
reorganization or via liquidation. 
A bleak picture emerges when one calculates the firm survival rates, without taking 
into account the going concern sales in liquidation procedures. Based on findings of 
White for the confirmation rates in Chapter 11, the table shows a firm survival rate of 
18% for the US (20% if the firms waiting on confirmation are included). If I would 
base it on the confirmation rate as found by Flynn, the survival rate would be 14%. 
For the UK, the eighth survey of SPI reveals that 10% of the Compulsory 
Liquidations and CVL’s (Company Voluntary Liquidations) involve a (partial) going 
concern asset sale. Together with the reorganized firms in Panel A (confirmed plans 
and going concern sales), the firm survival rate in the UK is 20%.35 In France, the 
firm survival rate is the lowest of the five countries, 6%. Joossen (1998) and Kaiser 
(1996) discuss the French rules regarding the sale of assets in bankruptcy. These rules 
seem to make going concern sales in the liquidation procedure difficult. Therefore, in 
the French case it is not possible to tell whether or not an upward correction based on 
unknown going concern sales in the liquidation procedure seems likely. Based upon 
the research by Thorburn (2000), the Swedish bankruptcy system is the odd man out. 
Although she studies liquidations only, she finds that in 75% of the cases the assets 
are sold as going concern, i.e. a 75% firm survival rate. This firm survival rate is 
probably distorted by a size bias, given the fact that Thorburn studies firms with at 
least 20 employees. The Finnish system delivers less fantastic results as the Swedish 
                                                          
34
  In interpreting this table, please take note that the confirmation rate in table 3 concerns the 
confirmation rate of reorganization plans. 
35
 The firm survival rate in the seventh survey is 30%. This is due to different sampling 
procedures and a 5% point higher business preservation rate among the administrations, 
CVA’s and receiverships when compared to the eighth survey.  
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one. Ravid & Sundgren (1998) find a firm survival rate of 29%. Ravid & Sundgren 
argue that a bias towards over-liquidation exists in the system, but placing their 
findings between the other four countries suggest that this system delivers acceptable 
results.  
As I pointed out above, a comparison of these studies can at most give an indication 
of similarities or differences between systems. Two additional issues need to be 
addressed. The first issue to note is that none of the studies cited, probably apart from 
the eighth SPI-survey data on the UK, can be considered as giving a good 
representation of the population of bankrupt firms in each of the countries. However, 
they point in the direction that much of the outcomes of bankruptcy systems are 
related to firm size. Given the SPI-data for the UK, liquidation seems to be the 
predominant way in which the very small firms end bankruptcy proceedings. The 
studies on smaller firms in Chapter 11 give credence to the idea that confirmation 
rates for these firms are steeply lower than those for firms with a median size above 
$1 million, i.e. the difference in confirmation rates as found by White (1984, 41%) 
and, e.g., Jensen-Conklin (1992, 17%) or Flynn (1989, 25%). The difference in the 
survival rates as found by Thorburn (median size $1.3 million) and Ravid & 
Sundgren (median size $0,7 million) is probably attributable to differences in size. In 
this respect the study by Thorburn resembles the study by White much more than the 
others. As Thorburn notes the survival rate in her sample matches the survival rate of 
firms only in Chapter 11 (confirmed plus going concern sales, i.e. 70%) in White’s 
sample. While Thorburn’s study is drawn from the total population of bankrupt firms, 
White’s study is drawn only from the population of firms in Chapter 11. In what way 
similar sized firms in Chapter 7 differ from those in Chapter 11 is not known. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether the performance of Chapter 11 is overstated in 
comparison with the performance of the Swedish system. 
The second issue concerns debt recovery rates in these systems. This issue is 
addressed in the section below. 
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6 Separating reorganization from liquidation and the 
influence on debt recovery rates 
Apart from survival rates, empirical evidence is available concerning total debt 
recovery rates in some of the countries discussed above.36 It is especially interesting 
to compare the recovery rates of liquidation-based systems with those of 
reorganization-based systems and discuss the problems associated with this 
comparison. I start by discussing these recovery rates and then focus attention on the 
problems in comparing these rates. 
For the US, I took the total debt recovery rate as reported by White (1984), namely 
40%. This percentage can be taken as a higher bound for the relatively smaller firms 
(the percentage concerns only Chapter 11 procedures). For the UK, I took the 
percentage as reported in Franks, Nyborg & Torous (1996) concerning the 
reorganization procedures, 44%.37 Thorburn finds a debt recovery rate of 35% for her 
total sample of 263 small to medium sized firms, and a 40% recovery rate for the 
cases in which the assets are sold going concern. This is comparable to the recovery 
rates found for the US and the UK, for firms in the same or larger size category. Only 
Flynn finds slightly higher recovery rates, although in varying degrees depending on 
bankruptcy districts. Ravid & Sundgren (1998) study the old Finnish Code and find a 
debt recovery rate of 34%. Sundgren (1998) studies the new Finnish Code and finds a 
recovery rate of 39% for firms in the reorganization procedure. One major problem in 
comparing recovery rates is the effect company size has on these rates. With size 
recovery rates go up. The cited studies have in common that they study companies of 
more or less the same size. However, this still need not be enough to make for a valid 
comparison. In a system that separates reorganization from liquidation (a separating 
system) a different signal concerning a firm’s viability may emanate given the route 
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 The “total debt recovery” is defined as the ratio of the total disbursements to all creditors 
(secured, (super-)preferred and unsecured) of the firm to the total outstanding nominal 
debts of the firm. 
37
 I do not use the SPI data here, because the recovery rates as found in the eighth survey 
seem to be primarily determined by very small firms. 
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taken to solve distress, compared to the signal that emanates from a liquidating 
system (a non-separating system). This difference in the two signals on firm viability 
influences sample recovery rates also via the way in which researchers select the 
cases to be studied. Firstly, I discuss the viability signals and, secondly, I discuss two 
biases that may arise in studying recovery rates in different systems. 
6.1 Firm viability signals in bankruptcy procedures 
In the section above, I compare the debt recovery rates of the Swedish and (old) 
Finnish system with the recovery rates in the US and the UK. The recovery rates of 
the liquidation-based systems seem to be somewhat lower than those attained in 
reorganization-based systems. Although this difference might be partly explained by 
differences in size, industry types, procedural costs, or debt structure, sample 
“selection” criteria may also cause this difference to arise. Consider the following. In 
a separating system as the US-system, Chapter 11 has consequences beyond the firms 
opting for Chapter 11. Firms that do not succeed in reorganizing in Chapter 11 send 
out a powerful signal to outsiders that the firm presumably is not worth continuing.38 
However, it need not be the case that every Chapter 11 “drop out” is to be liquidated 
for sure. Managerial failures and re-contracting failures might be instrumental to the 
drop out. These firms end up in the liquidation procedure, i.e. Chapter 7, and are 
(presumably) inefficiently liquidated. Revenues are depressed, because of the wrong 
use of assets, resulting in a downward bias in the recovery rates of Chapter 7. The 
size of this effect depends on the pervasiveness of re-contracting and managerial 
failures for the smaller firms in Chapter 11, and the possibility of selling assets going 
concern in Chapter 7. The anecdotal evidence as found in the literature is that Chapter 
7 ends primarily in piecemeal liquidations. As table 3 shows this would imply that 
more than 70% of the firms entering bankruptcy would be liquidated. Whether this 
figure is correct or not, it makes clear that we are seriously unaware of much of the 
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  Obviously, the firms that do succeed in reorganizing send out the opposite signal. These 
firms are included in any study on Chapter 11, whereas the other firms are not.  
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workings of Chapter 7, even to such an extent that it is nearly impossible to gauge the 
efficiency of the entire system. 
In a system in which this separation between reorganization and liquidation does not 
exist, this signal about a firm’s continuing value is messy. In liquidation procedures 
all firms are “liquidated”. Outsiders (creditors) observe only a sale of assets, which 
can be a going concern or a liquidating sale. However, no clear signal comes from the 
procedure whether the firm is worth more dead than alive. This makes it possible for 
a trustee in such liquidation-based systems to find out whether or not a going concern 
sale is a possibility for every company that enters the procedure. This possibility may 
not exist for the trustee in a system that separates liquidation from reorganization.  
6.2 Recovery rates in separating versus non-separating systems 
The difference in signals concerning the viability of firms in these two types of 
systems may lead to a bias in recovery rates in a separating system. The average 
recovery rate in a non-separating system contains going concern sales (presumably 
with higher recovery rates) and liquidations (with lower recovery rates).39 In a 
separating system the reorganization-based rule contains reorganizations and the 
liquidation-based rule “forced” liquidations. The firms that are inefficiently continued 
via the reorganization procedure, but later have to re-file again, then presumably end 
up in the liquidation procedure.40 These firms re-filing for Chapter 7 stay out of any 
sampling procedure aimed at finding reorganization cases. This means that, in 
researching Chapter 11, the recovery rates of these firms are based on promised 
payments that imply to high a valuation of such firms. This has evidently an upward 
bias in the recovery rates in the reorganization studies. Furthermore, these firms 
might have reached higher recovery rates if they would have been liquidated (even 
via a going concern asset sale) at an earlier phase in their “reorganization” process. 
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  As already mentioned Thorburn (2000) found for the going concern sales a 40% recovery 
rate and a for liquidations a 35% recovery rate. 
40
  Note that a firm may re-file a second or even third time for Chapter 11, but ultimately 
these inefficient firms will end up in the liquidation procedure. 
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This might result in a downward bias in the recovery rates in liquidation procedures 
(in separating systems). The correct way to compare the different systems is to match 
samples on the survival routes as suggested in figure 1. Going concern asset sales in 
liquidation-based systems should then be compared to the “really asset sale plans” 
and “really reorganization plans” in the reorganization procedure41. Furthermore, 
these reorganization cases should be complemented with the going concern sales in 
the liquidation procedure of separating systems. Excluding these latter cases in 
samples leads to an additional bias, discussed below.  
6.3 Going concern sales and reorganizations compared 
Another bias may exist when going concern sales in non-separating systems are 
compared to only Chapter 11 outcomes. The reorganization outcomes of going 
concern sales in Chapter 7 procedures should be included when recovery rates of all 
reorganized firms in a non-separating system are to be compared to all reorganized 
firms in a separating system. A priori, it is not clear whether the recovery rates of 
going concern sales in Chapter 7 will differ much from those attained in going 
concern sales in a non-separating system. Inasmuch Chapter 7 going concern sales are 
also adversely affected by a firm viability signal, it seems likely that these recovery 
rates are lower than the recovery rates on going concern sales in a non-separating 
system. Leaving these going concern sales in Chapter 7 out of the analysis, then 
results in an upward bias in the recovery rates of the only Chapter 11 cases compared 
to the going concern sales in non-separating procedure.  
It seems that this bias as well as the continuation bias discussed in the section above, 
work in the same direction when comparing going concern sales with reorganization 
cases. Some evidence on this conjecture is available through the work by Sundgren 
(1998). He compares recovery rates under the old Finnish Code with rates achieved 
under the new Finnish Code. He finds a statistically significant higher recovery rate 
of 9% for reorganization cases (new Code) over going concern sales under the old 
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  These samples should approximately have the same proportion of “re-filers”.  
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Code.42 The question is whether this surplus is caused by firms filing in an earlier 
stage of their financial problems for reorganization than they do for liquidation 
(which enhances the economic efficiency), and/or whether it might be due to illiquid 
asset markets (which makes going concern sales less attractive), and/or whether the 
comparison is biased by not taking into account the going concern asset sales in the 
liquidation procedure and by the continuation bias in the reorganization procedure. 
Although it is difficult to correct for these biases, it is at least necessary to find out the 
recovery rates of going concern sales achieved in liquidation procedures in separating 
systems. It is unclear whether the difference in recovery rates in going concern sales 
versus reorganizations is large enough to conclude that a separating system achieves a 
higher level of efficiency compared to the non-separating system. With these biases in 
mind, the recovery rates as found by Thorburn (2000), Ravid & Sundgren (1998) and 
Sundgren (1998) for Sweden and Finland, respectively, do not seem to differ that 
much from the US or UK to draw firm conclusion concerning the inefficiency of any 
of these systems. For this much more should be found out about Chapter 7 procedures 
(or, for the UK, compulsory liquidations and CVL’s), the effect size has on the way 
bankruptcy proceedings end and the associated recovery rates. 
7 Conclusions 
The discussion above cannot lead to the definitive proof of the failure of 
reorganization rules, or the success of liquidation rules, or vice versa. Too much 
about what is going on in liquidation procedures in separating systems is unknown. 
For instance, a going concern sale rate in Chapter 7 of 30% would instantly add 21% 
to the survival rate of the US-system in total. It also makes clear that the going 
concern asset sale is, or could be, an important instrument in resolving financial 
distress in any bankruptcy system. Restricting the use of this instrument in any, or 
part of a, procedure is surely to adversely affect total system efficiency. Furthermore, 
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 His sample shows the strange finding that under the old Code the going concern asset 
sales has a lower median recovery rate compared to the median recovery rate of 
piecemeal liquidations.  
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a system that tries to separate reorganization and liquidation cases may affect firm 
viability prospects in the liquidation procedure. This may diminish the chances of a 
firm to survive by way of a going concern sale in the liquidation-based procedure.  
Part of the studies discussed above also reveal that size has an important effect on 
survival and recovery rates, at least as is known from studies on Chapter 11 cases. 
Reorganization rules seem to be much more an economic necessity for larger firms, 
than for smaller firms, especially in terms of (direct) costs and debt recovery rates. 
Although one should note that we do not know the results if these Chapter 11 cases 
would have been sold as going concerns in a liquidation procedure.  
One of the more obvious implications from the analysis is that the figure and tables 
discussed above are far from perfect and that more data is needed on bankrupt firms 
in different procedures and in different size classes. At least such data should make it 
possible to solve (part of) the puzzle of differences in recovery rates over bankruptcy 
systems. It should also provide some evidence to what extent the going concern asset 
sale is inhibited by asset illiquidity, compared to the re-contracting and managerial 
failures in reorganization procedures. Another implication follows from the survival 
rates among countries, or more specific the differences in these rates. It leads me to 
suspect that other rules and regulations concerning firms in financial distress, not part 
of the bankruptcy codes, are, at least partially, driving these results. This is an area 
where a comparative study of bankruptcy law and especially parts of corporation and 
labor law could prove to be very insightful in the way liquidation rules “force” firms 
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